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Abstract
We analyze several exotic options of American style in a multi-
ple prior setting and study the optimal exercise strategy from the
perspective of an ambiguity averse buyer in a discrete time model of
Cox–Ross–Rubinstein style. The multiple prior model relaxes the as-
sumption of a known distribution of the stock price process and takes
into account decision maker’s inability to completely determine the
underlying asset’s price dynamics. In order to evaluate the American
option the decision maker needs to solve a stopping problem. Unlike
the classical approach ambiguity averse decision maker uses a class of
measures to evaluate her expected payoffs instead of a unique prior.
Given time-consistency of the set of priors an appropriate version of
backward induction leads to the solution as in the classical case. Us-
ing a duality result the multiple prior stopping problem can be related
to the classical stopping problem for a certain probability measure –
the worst-case measure. Therefore, the problem can be reduced to
identifying the worst-case measure. We obtain the form of the worst-
case measure for different classes of exotic options explicitly exploiting
the observation that the options can be decomposed in simpler event-
driven claims.
JEL subject classification: G12, D81, C61
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1 Introduction
The increasing trade volume of exotic options both in the plain form and as
component of more sophisticated products motivates the more precise study
of these structures. The OTC nature of contracts allows for almost endless
variety which comes at the price of tractability and evaluation complexity.
The payoff of the option is often conditioned on an event during the lifetime
leading to a path dependent structure which is challenging to evaluate.
Most of the literature on this field concentrates on hedging or replication
of such structures analyzing the hedging strategy of the seller or deriving the
no arbitrage price. This analysis is sufficient in the case of European options
as it also captures the problem of the buyer. However, in the case of Ameri-
can options the task of the buyer holding the option in her portfolio differs
structurally from the hedging problem of the seller. Unlike the bank/the
market the holder of the option is not interested in the risk neutral value of
the option but aims to exercise the claim optimally realizing highest possible
utility. This valuation in general needs not to be related to the market value
of the option as it reflects the personal utility of the holder which depends on
investment horizon and objectives and also on the risk attitude of the holder.
Given a stochastic model in discrete time, such as the Cox–Ross–
Rubinstein (CRR) model one can easily solve the problem of the buyer using
dynamic programming. However, classical binomial tree models impose the
assumption of a unique given probability measure driving the stock price
process. This assumption might be too strong in several cases as it requires
perfect understanding of the market structure and complete agreement on
one particular model.
As an example we consider a bank holding an American claim in its trad-
ing book. The trading strategy of the bank depends on the underlying model
used by the bank. If the model specification is error-prone the bank faces
model uncertainty. Being unable to completely specify the model traders
rather use multiple prior model instead of choosing one particular model. If
the uncertainty cannot be resolved and the accurate model specification is
impossible traders prefer more robust strategies as they perform well even if
the model is specified slightly incorrect.
Also a risk controlling unit assigning the portfolio value and riskiness uses
rather a multiple prior models in order to test for model robustness and to
measure model risk. Taking several models into account while performing
portfolio distress tests allows to check the sensitivity of the portfolio to model
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misspecification. Again in a situation of model uncertainty more robust
riskiness assignment is desirable as it minimizes model risks.
Similar reasoning can be applied to accounting issues. An investment
funds manager making his annual valuation is interested in the value of op-
tions in the book that are not settled yet. In case the company applies
coherent risk measures as standard risk evaluation tool for future cash flows
on the short side, it is plausible to use a multiple prior model evaluating
long positions. Finally, a private investor holding American claims in his
depot might exhibit ambiguity aversion in the sense of Ellsberg paradox or
Knightian uncertainty. Such behavior may arise from lack of expertise or
bad quality of information that is available to the decision maker.
Although for different reasons, all the market participants described above
face problems that should not be analyzed in a single prior model and need
to be formulated as multiple prior problems. In this paper we analyze the
problem of the holder of an American claim facing model uncertainty that
results in a multiple prior model. We characterize optimal stopping strate-
gies for the buyer that assesses utility to future payoffs in terms of minimal
expectation and study how the multiple prior structure affects the stopping
behavior.
Multiple prior models have gained much attention in recent studies.
Hansen and Sargent (2001) considered the multiple prior models in the con-
text of robust control, Karatzas and Zamfirescu (2003) approached the prob-
lem from game theoretical point of view. Delbaen (2002) introduced the
notion of coherent risk measures which mathematically corresponds to the
approach used in this paper.
The decision theoretical model of multiple priors was introduced by
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and further developed to dynamical settings
by Epstein and Schneider (2003b). This is the natural extension of the ex-
pected utility model when the information is too imprecise. The methods we
use in this paper rely heavily on this work.
Epstein and Schneider (2003a) applied the multiple prior model to finan-
cial markets and Epstein and Schneider (2003b) addressed the question of
learning under uncertainty.
Riedel (2009) considered the general task to optimally stop an adapted
payoff process in a multiple prior model and showed that backward induction
fails in general. He imposed more structure on the set of priors that ensured
the existence of the solution. The cornerstone of the method is the time-
consistency of the set of priors which allows the decision maker to change
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her beliefs about the underlying model as the time evolves. If the set of
priors is time-consistent one can proceed as in the classical case (see Snell
(1952),Chow, Robbins, and Siegmund (1971) for more detailed analysis) com-
puting the value process of the stopping problem – the multiple prior Snell
envelope. It is then optimal to stop as soon as the payoff process reaches
the value process. Additionally, the ambiguous optimal stopping problem
corresponds to a classical optimal stopping problem for a measure Pˆ – the
so-called worst-case measure (see Riedel (2009), Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004),
Karatzas and Kou (1998)).
As an application of the technique Riedel (2009) solves the exercise prob-
lem for the buyer of an American put and call in discrete time. A similar
problem was analyzed by Nishimura and Ozaki (2007), they considered the
optimal investment decision for a firm in continuous time with infinite time
horizon under multiple priors which can be related to the perpetual American
call. In this paper we follow the lines of Riedel (2009) and analyze several
exotic options that have a second source of uncertainty from the perspective
of the buyer in a multiple prior setting. We focus on the discrete time ver-
sion of the problem and develop an ambiguous version of the CRR model.
Instead of assuming that the distribution of up- and down- movements of the
underlying is known to the buyer we allow the probability of going up on a
node to lie in a appropriately modeled set.
This leads to a set of models that agree on the size of up- and down-
movement but disagree on the mean return. In this ambiguous binomial
tree setting which was first analyzed in Epstein and Schneider (2003a) we
aim to apply standard Snell reasoning to evaluate the options. Due to the
above mentioned duality result it is enough to calculate the worst-case mea-
sure Pˆ and then to analyze the classical problem under Pˆ . However, the
worst-case measure depends highly on the payoff structure of the claim and
needs to be calculated for each option separately. If the payoff satisfies cer-
tain monotonicity conditions the worst-case measure is easy to derive. The
direction/effect of uncertainty is the same for all states of the world and the
worst-case measure is then independent on the realization of the stock price
process leading to a statical structure that resembles classical models. In the
case of more sophisticated payoffs this stationarity of the worst-case measure
breaks down and the worst-case measure changes over time depending on the
realization of the stock price. This is due to the fact that uncertainty may
affect the model in different ways changing the beliefs of decision maker and
so the worst-case measure according to the effect that is dominating. This
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ability to react on information by adjusting the model and to choose the
model depending on the payoff is the main structural difference between the
classical single measure model and the multiple prior model considered here.
We identify additional sources of uncertainty that lead to the dynamical
and path-dependent structure of the worst-case measure. We also analyze
the impact of different effects of uncertainty on the overall behavior and the
resulting model highlighting differences between the single prior models and
the multiple prior model.
In our analysis we decompose the claims in monotone parts as the worst-
case measure for monotone problems is well known. We then analyze each
claim separately deriving the worst-case measure conditioned on monotonic-
ity. To complete the analysis we paste the measures obtained on subspaces
together using time-consistency. This idea is closely linked to the method of
pricing derivatives using digital contracts introduced by Ingersoll (2007) and
also used by Buchen (2004). However, this literature focuses on European
style options and does not cover the dynamical structure analyzed here.
In the case of barrier options the value of the option is conditioned on the
event of reaching a trigger. Unlike the plain vanilla option case, the lifetime
of an barrier option become uncertain as it depends on the occurrence of the
trigger event. This leads to an additional source of uncertainty causing a
change in the monotonicity of the value function when the stock price hits
the barrier. For example, in the case of an up-and-in put the ambiguity
averse decision maker assumes the returns to be low and chooses therefore
the measure with the lowest drift before the stock price reaches the barrier.
After hitting the barrier she obtains a plain vanilla put option monotone in
the underlying and uses therefore the measure with the highest drift. Similar
behavior can be observed for other types of barrier options.
The second group of options we focus on are the dual expiry options. Here,
the strike of the option is not known at time zero as it is being determined as
a function of the underlying’s value on a date different from the issue date of
the option – the first expiry. Therefore, additional to the uncertainty about
the final payoff the decision maker faces uncertainty about the value of the
strike before first expiry date.
In the case of shout options the first expiration date, the so-called shout
date/freeze date, is determined by the buyer. Here, the investor has to call
the bank if she aims to fix the strike. Therefore, the buyer of an shout option
faces two stopping problems: First, she has to determine the optimal shouting
time in order to set the strike optimally and then the to stop the payoff
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process optimally. The holder of an shout put gets an put after shouting and
thus, anticipates high returns after shouting. Before shouting however he
owns a claims whose value is increasing in the price of the underlying which
results in low returns anticipated before shouting.
Finally, we analyze options whose payoff function consists of two
monotone pieces. Typical examples are straddles and strangles. The buyer
of such options presumes a change in the underlying’s price but is not sure
about the direction of the change. Depending on the value of the underlying
the option pays off a call or a put, so as a consequence the actual payoff
function becomes uncertain. Here, one can decompose the value of the op-
tion in an increasing and a decreasing leg. The buyer of the option changes
her beliefs about the returns every time the value switches from decreasing
to increasing part of the value function. So, an ambiguity averse buyer of
a straddle presumes the stock price to go down in hausse phases and up in
baisse phases.
An outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the discrete
model which is in this form due to Riedel (2009). Section 3 recalls the solution
for payoffs monotone in underlying’s price introduced in Riedel (2009) and
builds the base for the following analysis. Section 4 provides the solution
for barrier options options, and Section 5 develops the solution for multiple
expiry. Finally, Section 6 discusses U–shaped payoffs
2 Time–Consistent Multiple Priors in dis-
crete Time
We first introduce the basic theoretical setup to evaluate options in multiple
prior model. This model has the CRR model as the starting point and was
already developed in Riedel (2009) and can be seen as a version of the IID
model introduced in Epstein and Schneider (2003a) with a different objective.
At the same time the model is the discrete time version of the κ–ignorance
model in Epstein and Chen (2002).
Having established the model we discuss the market structure and recall
the decision problem of the buyer and the solution method – the multiple
prior backward induction introduced by Riedel (2009).
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2.1 The stochastic Structure
To set up the model we start with a classical binomial tree. For a fixed matu-
rity date T ∈ N we consider a probability space (Ω,F , P0) where Ω = ⊗Tt=1S
with S = {0, 1} is the the set of all sequences with values in {0, 1}, F is the
σ–field generated by all projections εt : Ω → S and P0 denotes the uniform
on (Ω,F). By construction, the projections (εt)t=1,...,T are independent and
identically distributed under P0 with P0(εt = 1) =
1
2
for all t ≤ T . Fur-
thermore, we consider the filtration (Ft)t=0,...,T generated by the projections
(εt)t=1,...,T where F0 is the trivial σ–field – {∅,Ω}. The event εt = 1 repre-
sents an up-movement on a tree while the complementary event denotes the
down-movement.
Additionally, we define on (Ω,F , P0) a convex set of measures Q in the
following way: We fix an interval [p, p] ⊂ (0, 1) for p ≤ p and consider all
measures whose conditional one step ahead probabilities of going up on a
node of the tree remains within the interval [p, p] for every t ≤ T , i.e.
Q = {P ∈M1(Ω)|P (εt = 1|Ft−1) ∈ [p, p],∀t ≤ T} (1)
The set Q is generated by the conditional one-step-ahead correspondence
assigning at every node t ≤ T the probability of going up. correspondence. In
particular, Q contains all product measures defined via Pp(εt+1 = 1|Ft) = p
for a fixed p ∈ Q and all t < T . In the following we denote by P = Pp and
by P = Pp.
Clearly, the state variables (εt)t=1,...,T are independent under all product
measures. In general, however, (εt)t=1,...,T are correlated. To see this consider
the measure P τ defined via
P τ (εt+1 = 1|Ft) =
{
p if t ≤ τ
p else
for a stopping time τ < T . As the one-step-ahead probabilities remain in the
interval [p, p] the so defined measure P τ belongs to Q for all stopping times
τ < T . At the same time the probability of going up on a node depends on
the realized path through the value of τ and (εt)t=1,...,T are correlated.
The above example reveals an important structural feature of Q: The set
of measures is stable under the operation of decomposition in marginal and
conditional part. Loosely speaking, it allows the decision maker to change
the measure she uses as the time evolves in an appropriate manner. In the
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example above, the decision maker first uses the measure P until an event
indicated by the stopping time τ and then changes to P . Mathematically,
this property is equivalent to an appropriate version of the Law of Iterated
Expectation and is closely linked to the idea of backward induction. The
concept has gained much attention in the recent literature and was also
discussed under different notions by Delbaen (2002), Epstein and Schneider
(2003a), Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004) and ?.
The following lemma summarizes crucial properties of the set Q.
Lemma 2.1 The set of measures defined as in (1) satisfies the following
properties
1. Q is compact and convex,
2. all P ∈ Q are equivalent to P0,
3. Q is time-consistent in the following sense: Let P,Q ∈ Q, (pt)t, (qt)t
densities of P,Q with respect to P0. For a fixed stopping time τ define
the measure R via
rt =
{
pt if t ≤ τ
pτ qt
qτ
else
then R ∈ Q.
Due to Lemma 2.1 we can identify the set Q with the set of the density
processes with respect to the measure P0. In the following we denote by D
the density process of P ∈ Q with respect to P0, i.e. Dt = dPdP0 |Ft for P ∈ Q,
t ≤ T . A more detailed analysis of the structure of D can be found in Riedel
(2009). The setting is a version of discrete time-consistent multiple priors
on a binomial tree discussed in Riedel (2009). Another formulation can be
found in Epstein and Schneider (2003b).
2.2 The Market Model
Within the above introduced probabilistic framework we establish the finan-
cial market in the spirit of the CRR model. We consider a market consist-
ing of two assets: a riskless bond with a fixed interest rate r > −1 and
a risky stock with multiplicative increments. For given model parameters
0 < d < 1 + r < u and S0 > 0 the stock S evolves according to
St+1 = St ·
{
u if εt+1 = 1
d if εt+1 = 0
.
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Without loss of generality, we assume u · d = 1. This is a common and
appropriate assumption when dealing with exotic options in binomial models,
see Cox and Rubinstein (????) for instance.
For every t ≤ T the range of possible stock prices is finite and bounded,
we denote by
Et = {S0 · ut−2k|k ∈ N,−t ≤ k ≤ t}
the set of possible stock prices at time t. Moreover, the filtration generated
by the sequence (St)t=0,...,T coincides with (F)t=0,1,...,T and every realized path
of S (s1, . . . , st) can be associated with a realization of (εs)s≤t.
As the state variables are not independent under every probability mea-
sure P ∈ Q in our model the increments of S are correlated in general. The
probability of an up-movement depends on the realized path but stays within
the boundaries [p, p] for every P ∈ Q. As mentioned above the returns are
independent and identically distributed under all product measures in Q.
Economically, our model describes a market where the market partici-
pants are not perfectly certain about the asset price dynamics. In order to
express this uncertainty investors use a class of measures constructed above.
This inability to completely determine the underlying probabilistic law may
arise from lack or imprecise information or can be part of the distress stress
routine as discussed in the introduction. Clearly, the set Q is the set of
possible models the decision maker takes into account. Different choices of
P ∈ Q correspond to different models. With our specification mean return
on stock is uncertain and as one can easily see, P corresponds to the highest
mean return at every node, while P corresponds to the lowest mean return
on stock on every node. The specification of Q is a part of the model and
in practice may arise from regulation policies or be imposed by the bank ac-
counting standards, result from statistical consideration or just reflects the
degree of ambiguity aversion. The length of the interval [p, p] determines the
range of possible models. As the interval decreases the model converges to
the classical binomial tree model and we obtain the classical CRR model as
a special case of our model by choosing p = p.
Q can be interpreted as the set of models the decision maker takes into
account. The second difference between the classical binomial tree is the
introduction of correlated returns on stock. This allows to incorporate the
decision maker’s reaction on new arriving information. In our model the
investor is allowed to change the model she uses according to the available
information. Now the economical implication of time-consistency of Q be-
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comes clear. Due to this property the multiple prior decision maker is allowed
to use the measure P1 ∈ Q until an event indicated by a stopping time τ and
then to change his beliefs about the right model using P2 after τ . The mul-
tiple prior decision maker is allowed to adjust the model she uses responding
to the state of the market. However, this notion is not the same as classical
Bayesian learning as the decision maker has to little information or market
knowledge to learn the real distribution. While in the learning process the
decision maker updates the model adjusting the set of possible models, here
the investor keeps the set of possible models fixed not excluding any of the
possible models as the time evolves but choses a particular model at every
point of the time reconsidering her choice when new information arrives.
2.3 The Decision Problem
In this setting we consider an investor holding an exotic option in her port-
folio. As most of the exotic options are OTC contracts there is usually no
functioning market for this derivative or the trading of claims involves high
transaction costs. Therefore, in absence of a trading partner the buyer is
forced to hold the claim until maturity, so we exclude the possibility of sell-
ing the acquired contracts concentrating purely on the exercise decision of
the investor. In our analysis we mainly concentrate on institutional investors
already holding the derivatives in the portfolio. Therefore, it is plausible to
assume risk neutral agents who discount future payoff by the riskless rate.
Remark 2.2 When having a private investor exposing ambiguity aversion in
mind it seems natural also to introduce risk aversion and to discount by in-
dividual discount rate δ. As these considerations do not change the structure
of the worst-case measure obtained here, we omit this possibility maintaining
risk neutrality.
We consider an American claim A : Ω→ R+ written on S and maturing at T
that pays off A(t, (Ss)s≤t) when exercised at time t. Note, that we explicitly
allow path-dependent structures. The investor holdingA in her portfolio aims
to maximize her expected payoff choosing an appropriate exercise strategy.
As the expectation in our multiple prior setting is not uniquely defined the
ambiguity averse decision maker maximizes her minimal expected payoff, i.e.
maximize inf
P∈Q
EPA(τ, (Ss)s≤τ ) over all stopping times τ ≤ T. (2)
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The choice of the exercise strategy according to the worst possible model
corresponds to conservative value assignment. It treats long book positions
in the same way as the coherent risk measures treats short positions1. The
value of the multiple prior problem stated in (2) V Q is lower than the value
of the problem V P for every possible model P ∈ Q. Therefore, this notion
minimizes the model risk as the model misspecification within Q increases
the value of the claim.
robustness of the used model and considering the worst possible model.
Remark 2.3 1. The problem of the long investor stated in (2) differs
structurally from the task of the seller of the option. The seller of
the American claim needs to hedge claim against every strategy of the
buyer. To obtain the hedge she solves the optimal stopping problem
under the equivalent martingale measure P ∗. In the binomial tree the
unique equivalent martingale measure P ∗ is completely determined by
parameters r, u and d and does not depend on the mean return. See
Hull (2006) for a more detailed analysis. The situation is different for
the buyer as she solves the optimal stopping problem under the physical
measure taking the mean return into account and being interested in
personal utility maximization rather than in risk neutral valuation. Al-
though the buyer and the seller use different techniques assigning value
to the options and obtaining different values for the claim there is no
contradiction to no arbitrage condition because of the American struc-
ture of the claims considered here.
2. It is usual to evaluate claims in the book that are not settled yet using
mark-to-market approach. The value of the option is then set to be
equal to the market price. This makes sense if markets are well func-
tioning or if the investor intends to sell the option on the secondary
market rather than hold it until maturity. However, this approach may
value the claims wrongly if the market is malfunctioning or there is no
market at all as it was seen and still is seen at financial markets these
days. Multiple prior value assignment through V Q is an alternative to
the fair value accounting as it provides conservative value assignment
by using the worst possible scenario but protects the book value from
too pessimistic or overoptimistic views of the market that are due to
1Mathematically, our model is equivalent to a representation of coherent risk measures.
See Delbaen (2002) or Riedel (2009) for more detailed analysis.
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expectations and do not reflect fundamentals. However, V Q is not the
price for the option it is rather the private value for the investor that
may differ from the market view.
2.4 The Solution Method
If Q is a singleton the problem stated in 2 can be solved using classical dy-
namic programing methods. One defines backwards the value process of the
problem – the Snell envelope – and stops as soon as the value process reaches
the payoff process. This technique fails to hold in the multiple prior setting.
See Riedel (2009) for an example. Riedel (2009) extended backward induc-
tion to the case of time-consistent multiple priors stating sufficient conditions
for the Snell arguments to hold.
Theorem 2.4 (Riedel) Given a set of measures satisfying conditions stated
in Lemma 2.1 and a bounded payoff process X, Xt = A(t, (Ss)s≤t), define the
minimax Snell envelope UQ recursively by
UQT =XT (3)
UQt =max{Xt, inf
P∈Q
EP (UQt+1|Ft)} for t < T
Then,
1. UQ is the smallest multiple prior Q-supermartingale 2 dominating the
payoff process X.
2. UQ is the value process of the multiple prior stopping problem for the
payoff process X, i.e.
UQt = sup
τ≥t
inf
P∈Q
EP (Xτ |Ft)
3. An optimal stopping rule is then given by
τQ = inf{t ≥ 0|UQt = Xt}.
2Given a set of measures Q, a multiple prior supermartingale with respect to Q is an
adapted process, say S, satisfying St ≥ ess infP∈Q EP (St+1|Ft) for t ∈ N.
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Since we are in a finite setting and due to Lemma 2.1 we may replace the
inf-operator by the min-operator in the following.
The above result ensures the existence of the solution of problem (2).
Moreover, as shown by several authors (for example Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2004), Karatzas and Kou (1998), Riedel (2009)) problem (2) is equivalent
to a single prior problem for a measure Pˆ ∈ Q, i.e. the value function of the
multiple prior problem
UQ = U Pˆ P0-a.s.. (4)
The measure Pˆ is called worst–case measure and can be constructed via back-
ward induction by choosing the worst conditional one-step-ahead probability
on every node of the tree and pasting the so obtained densities together at
time 0. The worst-case measure is stochastic in general and depends on the
payoff process. In our setting one can characterize the worst case measure
through the density process D for every payoff process separately. Thus, the
worst–case measure is a part of the solution.
Due to equality (4) the optimal stopping strategies τQ of the multiple
prior problem and τ Pˆ of the problem for the prior Pˆ coincide. Therefore,
the problem can be solved in two steps. In the first step one identifies the
worst–case measure Pˆ and solves the classical problem under Pˆ in the second
step. This technique allows to make use of solutions already obtained in the
classical case. For problems where no closed form solution is available the
technique reduces numerical complexity by reducing the task to a single
model problem where methods are well developed.
Analyzing the exotic options we use this techniques emphasizing the be-
havioral interpretation of the worst–case measure and highlighting the dif-
ference between classical models and the multiple prior approach.
2.5 Options with Monotone Payoffs
In this subsection we provide the solution for claims whose payoffs are
monotone in the underlying’s price at each time and satisfy the Markov
property, i.e. the payoff of the option is not path-dependent. The most
famous examples for options of this class are plain vanilla put and call op-
tions. The results of this section build the foundation for the analysis of more
complicated payoffs in the next sections and were stated in Riedel (2009).
We consider a discounted American claim maturing at T and paying off
Xt = A(t, St) when exercised at t.
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Theorem 2.5 1. If the payoff function of the claim A(t, St) is increasing
in St for all t, then the multiple prior Snell envelope is U
Q = UP ,
and the holder of the claim uses the optimal stopping rule given by
τP = inf{t ≥ 0 : A(t, St) = UPt }.
2. If A(t, St) is decreasing in St for all t, the multiple prior Snell envelope
is UQ = UP , and an optimal stopping rule under ambiguity is given by
τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : A(t, St) = UPt }.
The key to this result is the fact that P (or P resp.) is the worst probability
measure in the sense of first–order stochastic dominance and that the payoff
is a monotone function of the underlying stock price. Using Theorem 2.5 we
can already solve the optimal exercise problem for the call and the put in
the multiple prior setting:
Corollary 2.6 (Call) A risk–neutral buyer of an American call uses an op-
timal stopping rule for the prior P . The value of American call at time zero
is given via
V Q0 = U
P
0 = EP
(
(Sτ −K)+(1 + r)−τ
)
,
where τ is the optimal stopping time with respect to P . In particular, if
pu+ (1− p)d > 1 + r, the American call is never being exercised.
Corollary 2.7 (Put) A risk–neutral buyer of an American put uses an op-
timal stopping rule for the prior P . The value of American put at time zero
is given via
V Q0 = U
P
0 = EP
(
(K − Sτ )+(1 + r)−τ
)
,
where τ is the optimal stopping time with respect to P .
These results help us to find the worst-case measure for more complicated
payoffs. Using appropriate decompositions we represent the options as
monotone claims. For those monotone claims we can identify the worst-
case measure using Theorem 2.5. Pasting the so obtained measures together
we construct the desired worst-case measure.
3 Barrier Options
Barrier options are among most traded exotic options and are often used
as components of more sophisticated derivatives. The knock-in/knock-out
14
feature of the options leads to a lower premium which has to be paid by
the buyer. In return, the buyer is exposed to the risk, for instance in the
knock-out case, that the underlying hits the barrier and the option becomes
worthless. For knock-in options the buyer faces the risk that the underlying
firstly has to hit the barrier level before the option becomes valuable. This
singularity of the payoff at the barrier makes the barrier option interesting
from the mathematical point of view and challenging to evaluate.
Before stating the results for barrier options we prove a technical theo-
rem which enables us to identify the worst-case measure for different path-
dependent payoffs. In the following we need some definitions and simplifica-
tions:
For the whole section let us assume that all given barrier levels H ∈ R+
lie on the grid of possible asset prices. This makes things significantly easier.
In particular, when one aims to specify an explicit formula for the value of
the optimal stopping problem. Furthermore, in the case of letting the grid
size tending to zero, without the assumption one would have to consider
upper- and lower-barriers and interpolate between both in order to obtain
reasonable results, see Hull (2006) for a more detailed review.
Now, let H > S0, t ∈ [0, T ]. A first-passage time τ is defined by
τ : Ω −→ [0, T + 1], τ(ω) := inf {t ≥ 0 : St(ω) ≥ H} ∧ T + 1.
For H > S0 we call these stopping times depending on the stock price up-
crossing times. We set FT+1 := FT and inf Ø := ∞. Similarly, we define
down-crossing times when H < S0. Clearly, these stopping times depend on
the whole path of the price process in general.
In practice, barrier options are said to be weak path-dependent which
emphasizes that their payoffs indeed depend on the whole path of the under-
lying’s price, but considering the two- dimensional process consisting of its
price and its maximal price, minimal price, respectively, reduces the prob-
lem to the usual Markovian case meaning that their payoffs at some time t
depend on the two-dimensional process only at that specific time t.
In contrast to plain vanilla options, the payoff process of barrier options is
not monotone in St for each t but depends on the event of whether the op-
tion’s underlying has hit the barrier up to time t or not. To express this fact
mathematically we use the notion of stochastic intervals. For two stopping
times the stochastic interval [τ1, τ2[ is defined by
[τ1, τ2[ :=
{
(s, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω ∣∣ τ1(ω) ≤ s < τ2(ω)} .
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We will often write with slight abuse of notation 1[τ1,τ2[(ω) instead of
1[τ1,τ2[(t, ω).
By means of stochastic intervals we extend Theorem 2.5 to more general
situations. We do not ask for monotonicity all the time but only on
stochastic intervals specialized by two stopping times τ1, τ2.
In order to identify the worst-case measure we can determine it recursively
by using backwards induction for computing the Snell envelope U as shown
in Riedel (2009). One observes that the worst-case conditional one-step-
ahead probability at time t, denoted by Pˆt, is characterized by the equation
Ut−1 = minP∈Q EP (Ut|Ft−1). So, in the case of a monotone payoff process X,
Pˆt is detected by calculating Ut−1, and the monotonicity of Ut−1 is inherited
by the monotonicity of Ut and Xt−1, as long as they possess the same.
In the following we will use this study to extend the theory to payoff processes
which do not exhibit the same monotonicity at all times but only on different
events.
By technical reasons we also need the following stopping times.
Definition 3.1 Let H be the barrier specifying τ2. If τ2 is up-crossing time
we define
σi := inf{t ∈ [σi−1 + 1, τ2[
∣∣St = H · d} ∧ T + 1
for 1 ≤ i ≤ T with the notation σ0 := −1. If τ2 is down-crossing time we
define for 1 ≤ i ≤ T
σi := inf{t ∈ [σi−1 + 1, τ2[
∣∣St = H · u} ∧ T + 1.
These stopping times are needed in order to specify the times/nodes at which
there is possibility to reach the second barrier in the next time step with
positive probability.
Theorem 3.2 Let H1, H2 be the barrier levels specifying τ1, and τ2, respec-
tively. Let the payoff process X = (Xt) be given by
Xt = x(t, St, τ1, τ2) = A(t, St)1[τ1,τ2[(t)
where A(t, ·) is monotone in S for all t, τ1, τ2 are up-crossing times (assume
S0 < H1 < H2) as defined in ??, or constant, with τ1 ≤ τ2 P0 − a.e..
Let (U Pˆt ) be the Snell envelope of (Xt) under Pˆ .
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1. If A(t, ·) is decreasing in S for all t, the multiple prior Snell envelope
is U = U Pˆ and the worst-case measure Pˆ is induced by the density
Dˆt := 2
t
∏
u≤ t∧τ1
(
εup+ (1− εu)
)
(1− p)
∏
u∈ ]τ1, t∧T ]
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
for all t ≤ T. An optimal stopping rule under ambiguity is given by
τˆ = inf
{
t ∈ [τ1, σ1]
∣∣Xt = U Pˆt } ∧ T .
2. If A(t, ·) is increasing in S for all t, the multiple prior Snell envelope
is U = U Pˆ and the worst-case measure Pˆ is induced by the density
Dˆt := 2
t
∏
u≤ t∧τ2: u 6=σi+1
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
) ∏
u≤t: u=σi+1
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
∏
u∈ ]τ2, t∧T ]
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
for all t ≤ T and all occurring 1 ≤ i ≤ T . An optimal stopping rule
under ambiguity is given by
τˆ = inf
{
t ∈ [τ1, σ1]
∣∣Xt = U Pˆt } ∧ T .
The proof will be given in appendix. It relies heavily on the theory about
the multiple prior Snell envelope constructed by backwards induction which
in turn needs time-consistency of the set of priors as a crucial tool.
Remark 3.3 Note that if τ2 ≤ T there exists always i ≤ T such that
τ2 = σi + 1. Note also that the worst-case measure is not unique. After
time τ2 the conditional one-step-ahead probabilities only have to satisfy
Pˆ (ε = 1 | Ft−1) ∈ [p, p] for all t > τ2 since the claim’s payoff is al-
ways 0 after τ2. Furthermore, exercising always happens at time σ1 at
the latest. Afterwards the payoff from exercising is always 0. There-
fore, the density of the worst-case measure is only relevant for the decision
maker up to step σ1 since afterwards she will not possess the option anymore.
A similar result as above also holds for down-crossing times. The only
difference is the monotonic behavior of X and U which changes for down-
crossing times. As a consequence, the densities of the worst-case measures
change. So, we will state the theorem without giving the proof since it would
be almost a copy of the one of Theorem 3.2.
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Theorem 3.4 Take the same assumptions as in Theorem 3.2 except the one
for τ1 and τ2 being now either down-crossing times or constant again. Thus,
assume S0 > H1 > H2.
1. If A(t, ·) is decreasing in S for all t, the multiple prior Snell envelope
is U = U Pˆ and the worst-case measure Pˆ is given by the density
Dˆt := 2
t
∏
u≤ t∧τ2: u 6=σi+1
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
) ∏
u≤t: u=σi+1
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
∏
u∈ ]τ2, t∧T ]
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
for all t ≤ T and all occurring 1 ≤ i ≤ T . An optimal stopping rule
under ambiguity is given by
τˆ = inf
{
t ∈ [τ1, σ1]
∣∣Xt = U Pˆt } ∧ T .
2. If A(t, ·) is increasing in S for all t, the multiple prior Snell envelope
is U = U Pˆ and the worst-case measure Pˆ is given by the density
Dˆt := 2
t
∏
u≤ t∧τ1
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
) ∏
u∈ ]τ1, t∧T ]
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
for all t ≤ T. An optimal stopping rule under ambiguity is given by
τˆ = inf
{
t ∈ [τ1, σ1]
∣∣Xt = U Pˆt } ∧ T .
Remark 3.5 An extension of the theorems to cases when τ1 is up-crossing
time and τ2 down-crossing time, or vice versa, is also possible. One can
also skip the condition τ1 ≤ τ2. This is just an assumption made to avoid
too many cases that have to be distinguished when proving the theorem and
stating the density. In special cases it is also possible to extend the theorem
to payoff processes which are finite sums of summands of the shape as in the
theorems. Later, we are illustrating this for an up-and-out ladder option.
The theorems above allow to analyze options which do not have the same
monotonicity all the time but conditioned on certain events. Here, these
technically demanding results lead quickly to the solutions. Generally, the
next subsections are applications of the above stated theorem.
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3.1 Simple Barrier Options
In this part we will apply the preceding theory to single barrier options. The
payoff of a single barrier option depends on the underlying’s price hitting
a barrier during the lifetime of the contract. In-options become valuable
when the asset price hits a predetermined barrier H. If this does not happen
over the lifetime of the contract, the option remains worthless. In contrast,
out-options become worthless when the stock price reaches a barrier.
While exercising American put and call can be reduced easily to the single
prior case by using monotonicity and stochastic dominance, see Corollaries
2.6 and 2.7, the picture is quite more involved in the case of American up-
and-in put and down-and-in call barrier options.
First, we consider the American up-and-in put with strike price K and barrier
H. We assume H > K and, to avoid the trivial case, H > S0. Let T > 0 be
the contract’s maturity. Denote by
τH = inf {t ≥ 0|St ≥ H} ∧ T + 1
the lined-in time. At time τH and afterwards, the barrier option coincides
with a plain vanilla American put initiated at τH , expiring at T and strike K.
Firstly the holder of such an option faces uncertainty about the event
whether the option is being knocked in. After knock-in she faces the same un-
certainty as holding a plain vanilla put. Both uncertainties work in contrary
directions. At the beginning her ambiguity aversion leads to the assumption
of having lowest drift in the option’s underlying’s price, and after knock-in,
she assumes highest drift which results in highest marginal probabilities for
up-movements of the option’s underlying.
This is stated in the next corollary and proven by means of Theorem 3.2.
Corollary 3.6 (Up-and-in put) For an American barrier up-and-in put
option with data as specified above the ambiguity averse agent uses the fol-
lowing prior Pˆ specified by the density
Dˆt := 2
t
∏
u≤ t∧τH
(
εup+(1−εu)(1−p)
) ∏
u∈ ]τH , t∧T ]
(
εup+(1−εu)(1−p)
)
for t ≤ T.
Hence, the value of the option at time t from the perspective of the ambiguity
averse buyer is given by
UQt = U
Pˆ
t = EPˆ [Xτˆ | Ft], (5)
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where τˆ is an optimal stopping time given by
τˆ = inf
{
t ∈ [τH , T ]
∣∣Xt = U Pˆt } .
Proof: We apply Theorem 3.2 part 1. Set τ1 := τH and τ2 := T + 1. The
discounted payoff process is given by Xt = (K − St)+/(1 + r)t1[τH ,T+1[ for
all t ∈ [0, T ]. Since A(t, St) := (K − St)+/(1 + r)t is monotone decreasing in
St for each t, Theorem 3.2 part 1 applies. 2
From the density of the worst-case measure we see that the pessimistic
buyer thus presumes a change of drift at knock-in. Before the option
becomes valuable, she uses the lowest mean return in her computations,
and afterwards, she uses the measure where the underlying asset price
has maximal mean return. This corresponds to the lowest conditional
one-step-ahead probabilities for up-movements before knock-in, and to
the highest ones afterwards, respectively. Furthermore, one sees that the
worst-case measure Pˆ is the pasting of P after P at τH and therefore, it
exhibits a non-stationary structure.
Let us rewrite equation (5) to get an explicit formula for the value process
(UQt ). By the last corollary U
Q
t = U
Pˆ
t for all t ≤ T . Hence, for t ≤ τH we
obtain by Bayes’ rule (see Karatzas and Shreve (1991), Lemma 5.3) and law
of iterated expectation
UQt = EPˆ [Xτˆ |Ft] = EP0
(
Xτˆ
Dˆτˆ
Dˆt
∣∣∣∣Ft
)
= EP0
[
EP0
(
Xτˆ
Dˆτˆ
DˆτH
∣∣∣∣FτH
)
DˆτH
Dˆt
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= EP
[
EP [Xτˆ | FτH ]
∣∣Ft] , (6)
where X = (Xt) denotes the discounted payoff process.
If t > τH
U Pˆt = EPˆ [Xτˆ |Ft] = EP
[
(K − Sτˆ )+/(1 + r)τˆ
∣∣Ft]
which equals the value of a plain vanilla American put in the ambiguity-averse
framework discounted to time 0.
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Formula (6) also demonstrates exactly what is interpreted above by ana-
lyzing the density of the worst-case measure. For t = 0 < τH , for instance,
equation (6) becomes
U Pˆ0 = EP
[
EP [Xτˆ | FτH ]
∣∣F0]
= EP
[
EP [(K − Sτˆ )+/(1 + r)τˆ−τH
∣∣FτH ]/(1 + r)τH]
= EP
(
T∑
i=0
EP{τH=i}[(K − Sτˆ )+1{τH=i}/(1 + r)τˆ−τH ]/(1 + r)τH
)
=
T∑
i=0
EP{τH=i}[(K − Sτˆ )+/(1 + r)τˆ−i]/(1 + r)iP (τH = i)
=
T∑
i=0
EP{τH=i}[(K − Sτˆ )+/(1 + r)τˆ−i]/(1 + r)i
JH
i
(
i
i+JH
2
)
p
i+JH
2 (1− p) i−JH2 ,
(7)
where JH is the positive integer such that H = S0u
JH . For a derivation of
the formula used in the last line see Feller (1968). The expectation in the
last line denotes the value under ambiguity of an American plain vanilla put
starting at time i with initial price of the underlying Si = H.
For finite maturity T there does not exist a constant early exercise boundary.
Thus, it is not possible to find a closed-form binomial expression for the
American put and the American up-and-in put, see also Reimer and
Sandmann (1995).
Using Theorem 3.4 part 2 we obtain the analogous result for an American
down-and-in call option with barrier H < S0. In the following we omit the
proves, or treat them only briefly, respectively, since they are also applications
of the last theorems. For an American down-and-in call option the discounted
payoff process X is given by Xt = (St −K)+/(1 + r)t 1{τH≥ t} for all t ≤ T ,
where τH := inf {t ≥ 0|St ≤ H} ∧ T + 1 and τ2 := T + 1. Using Theorem
(3.4) part 2 for a barrier level H < S0 we derive
Corollary 3.7 (Down-and-in call) The ambiguity averse agent uses the
following prior Pˆ given by the density
Dˆt := 2
t
∏
u≤t∧ τH
(
εup+(1−εu)(1−p)
) ∏
u∈]τH , t∧T ]
(
εup+(1−εu)(1−p)
)
for t ≤ T.
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Similar to an up-and-in barrier put option a down-and-in barrier call equals
a plain vanilla call option when the underlying hits the barrier level H. As
in (6) we can derive an analogous formula for the value process (UQt ) of the
down-and-in call option. For t ≤ τH we obtain
UQt = EP
[
EP [Xτˆ | FτH ]
∣∣Ft] , (8)
where τˆ is an optimal stopping time for this considered problem. Assuming
pu+ (1− p)d > 1 + r leads to the fact that τˆ = T , see Corollary 2.6. In this
case one can derive a binomial closed-form solution.
Another example is an up-and-out call option. The option is knocked out
when a prespecified barrier level is reached. This means the claim becomes
worthless. Using Theorem 3.2 part 2 we obtain by setting τ1 := 0, τ2 := τH
and the here reasonable assumptions H > S0
Corollary 3.8 (Up-and-out call) The ambiguity averse agent uses for an
up-and-out call option specified by the discounted payoff Xt := (St−K)+/(1+
r)t 1[0,τH [ for all t ≤ T the following prior Pˆ given by the density
Dˆt := 2
t
∏
u≤τH∧ t: u 6=σi+1
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
) ∏
u≤t: u=σi+1
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
∏
u∈ ]τH , t∧T ]
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
for all t ≤ T and all occurring 1 ≤ i ≤ T . In particular, a sufficient condition
for early exercise of the American up-and-out call at time t is specified when
the price at time t is larger or equal to H·d
(1+r)T−t +K
(
1− 1
(1+r)T−t
)
.
Proof: The agent uses the stated prior density due to Theorem (3.2) part
2. The early exercise payoff at each time is bounded from above by H ·d−K.
Therefore, early exercise at time t is optimal if
(St −K)(1 + r)T−t ≥ H · d−K
⇐⇒ St ≥ H · d
(1 + r)T−t
+K
(
1− 1
(1 + r)T−t
)
.
See also Reimer and Sandmann (1995). 2
Note that the early exercise condition is always satisfied for t = σ1.
Thus, early exercise occurs at time σ1 at the latest. Hence, the decision maker
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always exercises the option when there is knock-out danger meaning that the
option’s underlying might hit the barrier in the next time period and become
worthless. As a consequence, the decision maker does not directly experience
changes of the conditional one-step-ahead probabilities at all occurring times
σi + 1 since she exercises the option at or even before time σ1.
Remark 3.9 Assuming additionally in Corollary 3.8 that the inequality pu+
(1−p)d > 1+r is satisfied, the American up-and-out call is exactly exercised
at time σ1. This can be derived by the following reasoning: The value of the
American up-and-out call under ambiguity being still alive at a fixed time t
with St ≤ H · d2 is larger or equal to
1
1 + r
EPˆ
(
(St+1 −K)+ | St ≤ H · d2
)
=
1
1 + r
EP
(
(St+1 −K)+ | St ≤ H · d2
)
=
1
1 + r
(
(St · u−K)+p+ (St · d−K)+(1− p)
)
≥ max
{
1
1 + r
(
(St · u−K)p+ (St · d−K)(1− p)
)
, 0
}
≥ max
{(
St − K
1 + r
)
, 0
}
≥ (St −K)+ for all St ≤ H · d2.
The first inequality follows by assumption pu + (1 − p)d > 1 + r. This
shows that the sufficient condition for early exercise is not satisfied for all
St ≤ H ·d2. Thus, in this case early exercise is only optimal at time σ1 when
the price equals H · d.
Without the early exercise feature, the ambiguity averse buyer of the
option would face all changes of the conditional one-step-ahead probabilities
that might occur during the option’s lifetime. This is being illustrated in
the next subsection when considering a so-called ladder option.
Down-and-out put options behave analogously to up-and-out call options.
Besides, there are four further types of barrier options exhibited with one sin-
gle barrier level. But due to their structure, their payoffs possess the same
monotonicity in S at each time and the worst-case measure for these types can
be identified by using results from the previous section. As a consequence,
in these cases the worst-case measure does not feature path-depending vary-
ing conditional one-step-ahead probabilities induced by ambiguity as we saw
before.
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3.2 Multiple Barrier Options
The above reasoning can also be applied to options endowed with more than
one barrier. As mentioned in Remark 3.5 one can use the theorems to attain
the worst-case measure for options with both a knock-in and a knock-out
barrier level, or for out-options, additionally exhibited with a further barrier
level which replaces the preceding one after some prespecified time progress.
This shall be demonstrated in the following. We examine ladder options
and focus on the special case of an up-and-out ladder call option expiring at
time T with two barrier levels H1 and H2. We assume S0 < H1 < H2. This
claim resembles a single up-and-out barrier call option with the additional
feature that after some prespecified date t1 ∈ (0, T ) the knock-out barrier
changes from H1 to the higher level H2, meaning that the first barrier H1
is only valid up to time t1. Afterwards, the second barrier H2 is valid and
determines the knock-out event.
As we will see, this difference related to single up-and-out call options
might have impact on the buyer’s early exercise strategy which in turn might
affect the significance of varying conditional one-step-ahead probabilities
when the underlying’s price is close to the first barrier before time t1. The
reason is quite obvious. Now, in the case of the underlying’s price is close
to H1 before time t1, the buyer might find it not optimal to exercise the
claim. For instance, if the second barrier H2 is very high, or, the first barrier
H1 is close to the strike price K, the benefit from exercising before time
t1 will be quite low compared to possible future exercise payoffs after time
t1. This situation is being expressed by the required inequality below, see (9).
Formally, the discounted payoff at time t of such a ladder call option with
strike price K < H1 and maturity T is given by
Xt =

(St −K)+/(1 + r)t, if t ≤ t1 and t < τH1
(St −K)+/(1 + r)t, if t > t1, t < τH2 and t < τH1
0, else
= (St −K)+/(1 + r)t 1[0,τH1∧t1[ + (St −K)+/(1 + r)t 1[t1,τH2∧τH1 [
whereas τH1 := inf{t ∈ [0, t1]
∣∣St = H1} ∧ T + 1 and
τH2 := inf{t ∈ ]t1, T ]
∣∣St = H2} ∧ T + 1. Here, [t1, t1[ is defined as the empty
set. In order to represent the density of the worst-case measure we need as
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in Definition 3.1 the following stopping times:
σi := inf{t ∈ [σi−1 + 1, τH1 ∧ t1 − 1[
∣∣St = H1 · d} ∧ T + 1
for all 1 ≤ i < t1 with the notation σ0 := −1 and
γ := inf{t ∈ [t1, τH2 [
∣∣St = H2 · d} ∧ T + 1.
Furthermore, for t ≤ T let Ω(t) :=
⊗t
i=1{0, 1} denote the set of all paths in
Ω up to time t.
Corollary 3.10 (Ladder call option) Let all data be given as above, in
particular, let us suppose the strict inequality of Corollary 3.8. Additionally,
suppose that the value function satisfies for all ω(t) ∈ Ω(t) with St(ω(t)) = H1d
the following inequality
Xt(ω(t)) < (1− p)Ut+1(ω(t), 0) (9)
for all t < τH1 ∧ t1. Then the ambiguity averse buyer of this ladder option
uses the following prior Pˆ specified by the density
DˆT := 2
T
∏
u≤τH2∧T : u 6=σi+1 and u 6=γ+1
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
∏
u≤T : u=σi+1 or u=γ+1
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
∏
u∈ ]τH2 ,T ]
(
εup+ (1− εu)(1− p)
)
for all occurring 1 ≤ i < t1. In particular, the agent uses the canonical
optimal stopping rule τˆ which is less or equal to γ ∧ T.
Proof: Examination of the proof of Theorem 3.2 reveals that we
can also apply the second part of the theorem to this special situation
since the time interval [0, T ] is divided into two disjoint intervals and
A(t, St) := (St−K)+/(1+r)t, which is increasing in St for all t ≤ T , remains
the same on both intervals. Thus, applying the theorem on both subintervals
yields the density for the ambiguity averse agent. The canonical optimal
stopping rule is also specified by the theorem. The requested inequality (9)
guarantees that the decision maker does not exercise the valuable option at
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node H1 · d when being located before time t1. From the beginning of time
t1 the same arguments as in the case of an usual up-and-out call option (see
Corollary 3.8) lead to an optimal stopping time. So, this ladder option is
held up to time γ at most. 2
This example exhibits many modifications of conditional one-step-ahead
probabilities. On the one hand, whenever it is possible that the option might
knock-out in the next time period, the conditional one-step-ahead probability
switches and thus puts high weight on an up-movement of the underlying’s
price. On the other hand, whenever the option does not knock out in that
specified period, the conditional probability switches back to the marginal
probability weighting before since an option’s knock-out is not possible in the
next forthcoming time period. Unlike an American up-and-out call, the de-
cision maker experiences all these varying marginal probabilities before time
t1 since now early exercise is not optimal due to the required assumptions.
4 Multiple Expiry Options
In this section we analyze exotic options that are characterized by several
expiry dates. At every expiry the owner of the option has the right to modify
the contract conditions reseting the strike or the maturity in a predefined way.
New conditions of the contract depend on the underlying’s value at expiry
dates and are not known to the buyer at time zero. Therefore, additionally
to the uncertainty about future underlying’s value the decision maker faces
uncertainty about future contract conditions while evaluating the option.
The expiry dates can be predefined points in time (forward start options) or
random dates chosen by the buyer or seller of the contract (shout options).
Such options can be seen as a sequence of claims where every claim expires
at a predefined date and pays off a new born claim expiring at the next expiry
date. In the case of European claims the expiry dates are deterministic
corresponding to forward start options. In the case of shout options we face
American claims leading to stochastic expiry dates. In general, multiple
expiry options can be entitled with any number of expiry dates, here, we
consider dual expiry options where contract conditions change exactly once.
Kwok and Wu (2004) analyze shout options with infinite number of shout
possibilities and establishes a relation to lookback options.
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4.1 Shout Options
Shout options are contracts that give the buyer the right to reset the strike
at a date chosen by the buyer. The event of reseting the contract features is
called shouting and gives the structure its name. The reset right allows the
investor to benefit from market movements by choosing a favorable strike.
At the same time she can lock in already realized profits ensuring against an
unfavorable stock movement.
Shout options are often used by professional investors as a cheaper alternative
to lookback options. Whereas the buyer of the lookback option has the right
to sell the stock at the maximal price the owner of the shout option has to
call her bank and to freeze the price at which she can sell/buy at any time
σ before maturity. The structure becomes active and the buyer has to have
enough understanding of the market in order to set the strike as close as
possible to the peak. Mathematically, the buyer faces an optimal stopping
problem, aiming to set the strike optimally.
In the following we analyze shout puts focusing on a more special case
later on. The same analysis can be performed for call options.
At time zero the buyer of a shout put receives a plain vanilla put option
with strike K0 and maturity T with additional right to modify the strike of
the contract once at any time prior to maturity by calling her bank and fixing
the strike in a predefined way. At the time of shouting the buyer locks in
the realized profits by receiving a cash payment (K0 − Sσ), additionally, she
receives a new option of European style with strike K1 = f(S, σ), where f is
a Fσ measurable function of the whole path S = (S1, . . . , ST ). At maturity
the buyer receives the positive part of the difference between the strike K1
and the final stock price, i.e. (K1 − ST )+. The contract is then specified by
the initial strike K0, the function f determining the new strike K1 and the
maturity date T . This structure allows the investor to lock in realized profits
protecting himself against downside risk by receiving the cash payment and
at the same time to participate on future upside with the new born option.
To simplify the analysis we consider a particular shout option – the so
called single shout floor that allows for closed form solutions even in finite
time. The initial strike of the single shout floor K0 is equal to zero and
the strike K1 is given by K1 = f(Sσ) = Sσ. The buyer shouts once at
σ ≤ T fixing the strike at Sσ. At the expiry date she receives a payoff that
corresponds to the payoff profile of an European put i.e. (Sσ − ST )+. Thus,
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the buyer of this shout option has to solve the following problem
Maximize min
P∈Q
EP ((Sσ − ST )+/(1 + r)T ) over all stopping times σ ≤ T
(10)
Note, that unlike the American put, the exercise date is fixed but the birth
date has to be determined optimally by the buyer. Determining the optimal
starting time/shouting time constitutes the optimal stopping problem for the
single shout option. The task is to optimally start the payoff process rather
then stop it which can be seen as purchasing a new issued European option
with a fixed maturity. We will maintain this parallel during our analysis.
However, we cannot apply our standard theory of backward induction to
the problem stated in (10) because the payoff (Sσ − ST )+/(1 + r)T obtained
from stopping at any stopping time σ ≤ T depends on the value of the stock
at maturity and is for this reason not adapted to the filtration (F)t=1,...,T . To
overcome this difficulty we condition the payoff on the available information
and consider the following payoff process
Xt = min
P∈Q
EP ((St − ST )+/(1 + r)T |Ft). (11)
For every t ≤ T we can interpret Xt as discounted multiple prior value of
the shout floor if shouted at t. At the same time it corresponds to the value
of an at-the-money European put issued at t and maturing at T evaluated
under multiple priors.3
Using the appropriate version of the law of iterated expectations one can
easily see that for all stopping times σ ≤ T we have
min
P∈Q
EP ((Sσ − ST )+/(1 + r)T ) = min
P∈Q
EP (Xσ) (12)
Therefore, we can reformulate the problem stated in (10) equivalently in the
following way
Maximize min
P∈Q
EP ((Xσ) over all stopping times σ < T (13)
where the payoff process X is defined via (11). Thus, the optimal stopping
time found for (13) is also optimal for the problem (10) and the values of
3Strictly speaking, the value of the European put issued at t and maturing at T differs
from the expression (11) by a discount term
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the two problems coincide. Again, we can interpret the problem as optimal
investment in a put with a fixed investment horizon.
We solve the problem in two steps: first we compute Xt – the explicit
value of the shout option freezed at t for all t ≤ T and derive the worst-
case measure after shouting. In the second step, we identify the worst-case
measure before shouting reducing the problem to the single prior case.
To compute Xt for a fixed t ≤ T we note that the uncertainty about the
strike is resolved at the time of shouting. The strike becomes a constant
and as a consequence the claim becomes a plain vanilla European put. As
the payoff of the put is decreasing in St for all t ≤ T by Theorem (2.5) we
conclude that the worst-case measure is given by P and we have
Xt =min
P∈Q
EP
(
(St − ST )+/(1 + r)T |Ft
)
=EP ((St − ST ))+/(1 + r)T |Ft).
Additionally, under P the increments of the underlying between t and T –
∆(St, ST ) are independent for all t ≤ T which leads to
Xt =St · EP ((1−∆(St, ST ))+/(1 + r)T |Ft) (14)
=:St · g(t, T, P )
where
g(t, T, P ) = (1 + r)−T
k∗(t)∑
k=0
((
n
k
))
pk · (1− p)n−k (1− dn−2k)
and k∗(t) =: max
{
k : k < T−t
2
}
The above equation provides the value of the embedded option contained
in the shout contract maturing at T at the time of shouting. At the same
time it corresponds to the value of the at-the-money European put issued at
t ≤ T and maturing at T .
The buyer of a shout option uses P to evaluate the option after shouting.
Moreover, the value of a freezed shout floor is homogeneous of degree one in
the current stock price St. As the expiry date T and the measure P remain
fixed we omit them in the following and write g(t, T, P ) as g(t).
To complete the analysis it remains to determine the worst-case measure
before shouting and to solve the optimal stopping problem for X under the
worst-case measure.
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As g(t) > 0 for all t ≤ T Xt as a function of t and St is increasing in St
for all t ≤ T . Again using Theorem (2.5) we conclude that the worst-case
measure of problem (13) is given by P .
Remark 4.1 It might be surprising at the first sight that the value of the put
contained in the shout contract at the time of shouting increases if the strike
increases. The reason for this observation contradicting the usual intuition is
the fact that the strike is not a constant at the moment of issuance of the op-
tion. The value of the claim at the time of shouting is increasing with respect
to the difference between strike and the current stock price. Economically, a
higher St at the time of shouting increases the strike of the new born option
enlarging the in-the- money region of the option.
As a result of the above discussion on the monotonicity of the claim we obtain
the following:
Corollary 4.2 (Shout put) A risk-neutral buyer of an single shout floor
option uses the optimal stopping rule for the prior Pˆ given by the density
Dˆt = 2
t
σ∧t∏
v=1
(
p · εv + (1− p) · (1− εv)
) t∏
v=σ+1
(
p · εv + (1− p) · (1− εv)
)
.
(15)
Summing up, we conclude that the value of the shout floor is given by
UQt =
{
EP
(
EP
(
(Sσ − ST )+/(1 + r)T |Fσ
))
, if t < σ
EP
(
(Sσ − ST )+/(1 + r)T |Ft
)
else
The decision maker changes her beliefs about mean returns at the first expiry
date. Before shouting and freezing the strike she presumes low returns of
the stock that keeps the in-the-money region of the option small and the
embedded put option less worth; after shouting she receives a put option
and therefore changes her belief — being pessimistic, she presumes now that
the risky asset will have high returns. This change of beliefs causes the
difference in the values of the classical result and the multiple prior result.
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5 Quasi-convex payoffs
In the last section we consider options that consist of two monotone parts.
Typical examples are options having U–shaped payoff including straddles,
strangles or short option strategies. Investors buying such options are spec-
ulating on change in the underlying’s value without specifying the direction
of the change. Depending on the actual price of the underlying falling or
rising stock increases the profit of the investor. This fact leading to different
monotonicity type with respect to underlying causes different beliefs at dif-
ferent stock prices. One can think of this effect as of getting different payoff
function conditioned on the stock price. Thus, stock price uncertainty in-
duces uncertainty about the payoff function. To illustrate this idea consider
a straddle: by exercising the straddle above the strike the buyer gets a pay-
ment of (St−K) which corresponds to a call. Otherwise, she gets the payoff
of a put – (K − St). Thus, depending on the current stock price the payoff
function changes, at time zero the actual payoff function is not known to the
buyer. This uncertainty about the payoff function cannot be resolved over
time in general.
Remark 5.1 Mathematically, payoffs described above correspond to quasi-
convex/quasi-concave payoff functions. Note, that we still deal with functions
defined on natural numbers and have to be careful when using the term quasi-
convex. Strictly speaking, the notion we use corresponds to discrete convexity
studied intensively in the context of indivisible goods (see for example Murota
(1998) for a general introduction). In one dimensional setting discrete con-
vexity reduces to the following: A set E ⊂ N is convex if all points in E
are contained in the convex hull of E. The definition of quasi-convex is then
straight forward.
In our analysis we concentrate on piecewise linear, U–shaped payoffs paying
off f(t, St) when exercised at t ≤ T where f has the following form:
f(t, St) = c1 · (K1 − St)+ + c2 · (St −K2)+
for c1, c2 ∈ R, K1 ≤ K2. However, our results apply to more general
functions as quadratic or ladder functions. We show that the Snell envelope
UQt at time t ≤ T is a quasi-convex function in St if the claim is Markovian.
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Lemma 5.2 If the discounted payoff function A(t, St) is quasi-convex in its
second variable for every t ≤ T , then the Snell envelope UQt is given by a
quasi-convex function v(t, x), i.e. given St = xt
UQt = v(t, xt) = sup
τ≥t
min
P∈Q
EP (A(τ, Sτ )|St = xt)
Proof: We have to show that for every t ≤ T the value function v(t, ·) de-
pends only on the value of the stock at time t and that the quasi-convexity of
the payoff function carries over to the value function. We do it via backward
induction.
Before applying backward induction we note that in one-dimensional case
a function g : E → N is quasi-convex if and only if there exists a xˆ ∈ E such
that g(x) ≥ g(xˆ) holds for all x ∈ E. If xˆ belongs to the boundary of E the
function g is monotone. If xˆ belongs to the interior of E g consists of two
monotone parts and reaches its minimum at xˆ. In any case, quasi-convexity
reduces to the existence of a unique minimum in one dimensional case.
For t = T we clearly have for all possible values of ST = xT
UQT = A(T, xT )
where A(T, ·) is a quasi-convex function.
For t+1 < T we assume that for any value of St+1 = xt+1 ∈ Et+1 the value
function v(t + 1, ·) is quasi-convex function depending only on the current
value of the stock. Because of quasi-convexity there exists a unique minimum
mt+1 and a unique
xˆt+1 = inf{xt+1 ∈ Et+1|v(t+ 1, xt+1) = mt+1}.
The function v(t+1, ·) is decreasing on the set {xt+1 ≤ xˆt+1} and increasing
on the set {xt+1 ≥ xˆt+1}.
In t < T we then have for any value St = xt
UQt = max{A(t, St),min
P∈Q
EP
(
UQt+1|Ft
)}
= max{A(t, xt),min
P∈Q
EP
(
UQt+1|St = xt
)}
= max {A(t, xt), pˆt+1v(t+ 1, xt · u) + (1− pˆt+1)v(t+ 1, xt · d)}
= v(t, xt)
(16)
where pˆt+1 ∈ [p, p] is the marginal of the worst-case measure Pˆ at time t.
Since v(t+1, ·) is independent of the realized past, the minimizer pˆt+1 depends
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only on the value of xt. This proves that the value function at time t v(t, ·)
depends only on current value of the underlying.
To prove quasi-convexity we analyze the structure of the continuation
value in equation (16)
u(t, xt) := pˆt+1v(t+ 1, xt · u) + (1− pˆt+1)v(t+ 1, xt · d)
for different values of St = xt.
On the set
Edt = {xt ∈ Et|xt ≤ xˆt+1 · d} (17)
xt · d < xt · u < xˆt+1 and therefore using the induction hypothesis we can
conclude that the function u(t + 1, ·) is decreasing as a convex combination
of two increasing functions. Similarly, for all
Eit = {xt ∈ Et|xt ≥ xˆt+1 · u} (18)
we have xˆt+1 < xt · d < xt · u and the function increases on the above set
with the same argument.
Because of the binomial tree structure of the state space and the fact that
Et+1 = {Et · uk|k ∈ {−1; 1}}
equations (17) and (18) partition the set of possible values of St and Et can
be written as
Et = {xt ∈ Et|xt ≤ xˆt+1 · d} ∪ {xt ∈ Et|xt ≥ xˆt+1 · u}
Because of monotonicity of u(t, ·) on Edt and Eit the minimum of u(t, ·) is
unique. This shows that the function u(t, ·) is quasi-convex.
To complete the proof we recall that A(t, xt) is quasi-convex by assump-
tion. Thus, the function defined by equation (16) is a quasi-convex function
as maximum of two quasi-convex functions. Clearly, the value function at
time t depends only on the current stock price and given St = xt we can
write UQ as a function v(t, xt). 2
The quasi-convexity of the value function implies that for every t ≤ T
we can separate the space Et on which the value of the claim is monotone
allowing to determine the worst-case measure. The decomposition point is
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the minimizer of the value function xˆt which is constructed in the proof of
Lemma 5.2.
Having analyzed the shape of the value function we now can compute
the worst-case measure with the following argument. If asset prices are low,
the value function is decreasing. Therefore, with the same argument as for
simple American options, one can show that P is the worst-case measure
here. In the other region on the contrary, P is the worst-case measure. At
a predefined level xˆt the investor changes his beliefs and so the mean return
on stock under the measure. We then have the following
Lemma 5.3 (Straddle) The buyer of a straddle uses the optimal stopping
rule for the measure Pˆ with density
Dˆt = 2
t
∏
v≤t,Sv∈Eiv
(
p · εv+(1−p) · (1− εv)
) ∏
v≤t,Sv∈Edv
(
p · εv+(1−p) · (1− εv)
)
.
Proof: We consider the value function on the continuation region where
for a given St = xt we have U
Q
t = v(t, xt)
v(t, xt) = min
pt+1∈[p,p]
(pt+1v(t+ 1, xt · u) + (1− pt+1)v(t+ 1, St · d)
As v(t, ·) is decreasing on Edt , the worst-case measure on this set is given by
P . With the same argument the worst-case measure Pˆ is P on Eit , i.e.
Pˆ [εt+1 = 1|Ft] =
{
p on {xt ≥ xˆt+1 · u}
p on {xt ≤ xˆt+1 · d} . (19)
where xˆt+1 is the minimizer of v(t+1, ·). Using the definition of p and p and
pasting the densities together one obtains the result. 2
Under Pˆ the process (St) becomes mean-reverting in an appropriate sense
pushing St down if it is high and up if it is low. This corresponds to the in-
tuition: the ambiguity averse decision maker anticipates low mean returns
in hausse phases and high mean returns when the stock value is low. Unlike
previous cases the uncertainty about the payoff function here cannot be re-
solved before T in general. The change of the measure occurs every time the
stock price crosses the critical value xˆt forcing the decision maker to change
her beliefs about mean returns.
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6 Conclusion
This paper studies the optimal exercise strategies of the buyer of various
American options in a framework that allows for model uncertainty in dis-
crete time. The imprecise information about the correct probability measure
driving the stock price process in the market generates different models with
varying conditional one-step-ahead probabilities used by the buyer. The
buyer then is allowed to change the measure, and so the model she uses
and to assign the value to the claim according to the worst possible model.
While the solution for plain vanilla options is straightforward in the model
the situation differs if the payoff of the option becomes more sophisticated.
The effect of uncertainty differs over time leading to a dynamical structure of
the worst-case measure. This paper analyzes different effects of uncertainty
highlighting the structural difference between the standard models used in
Finance and the multiple prior models: the buyer of the option adapts her
beliefs to the state of the world and the overall effect of model uncertainty.
A natural next step is to extend the theory to continuous market models and
to analyze exotic options in that framework.
A Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof: We give proof for decreasing A in St for all t ≤ T . The second case
works analogously. For notational simplicity we write ω(t) for an element in⊗t
i=1{0, 1} ⊆ Ω. Furthermore, for a stopping time τ we introduce for each
t ≤ T the restriction τ t of τ to pathes in Ω running up to time t:
τ t :
t⊗
i=1
{0, 1} −→ [0, t] ∪ {T + 1}
ω(t) 7−→ τ t(ω(t)) =
{
τ(ω(t)), if τ(ω(t)) ≤ t
T + 1, if else
.
The restricted stopping are being used in order to be mathematically more
exact.
We start the proof with
Lemma A.1 Let (UQt ) be the multiple prior Snell envelope of X as defined
in Theorem 3.2. Assume that UQt is given by the function u(t, St, τ
t
1, τ
t
2) for
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all t ≤ T . Then for all t ∈ [0, T − 1] and all k ∈ [1, T − t]
u(t, S, t, T + 1) ≥ u(t+ k, S, t+ k, T + 1).
Proof: The inequality follows directly by the inequality
u(t, S, t, T + 1) ≥ u(t+ k, S, t, T + 1) = u(t+ k, S, t+ k, T + 1).
The inequality always holds for claims of American style whose undiscounted
payoff does only depend on the underlying’s price S at each time. For the
special choice of τ t1 and τ
t
2 it therefore also holds for the considered claims of
the theorem. The equality holds since the claim is already knocked-in. 2
Using theory about multiple prior Snell envelope, see Riedel (2009), we show
by backwards induction in t that UQt = u(t, St, τ
t
1, τ
t
2) for all t such that u
has the following properties:
(i) for t < τ t1 : u (t, ·, τ t1(·), τ t2(·))↗ in S ≤ S¯1,
where S¯1t is determined by τ
t
1(S¯
1) = t
(ii) for t ∈ [τ t1, τ t2[ : u (t, ·, τ t1(·), τ t2(·))↘ in S
(iii) for t ≥ τ t2 : u (t, ·, τ t1(·), τ t2(·)) = 0 for all S.
First, note that u is well-defined due to the definition of the payoff process
X. (u complies with the definition of a function since Xt which only depends
on St, τ
t
1, and τ
t
2, does for each t ≤ T .) For t = T we have
UQT (·) = XT (·) = 1[τT1 ,τT2 [(T, ·) A(T, ST (·))
=
{
0, if τT1 = T + 1 or τ
T
2 ≤ T
A(T, ST ), if τ
T
2 = T + 1 and T ≥ τT1
=
{
0 = u(T, ST , τ
T
1 , τ
T
2 ) ∀ST , if τT1 = T + 1 or τT2 = T
A(T, ST ) = u(T, ST , τ
T
1 , T + 1) ∀ST , if τT1 ≤ T < τT2
.
So, UQT satisfies the representation and the properties by the assumptions on
XT , A(T, ·), respectively.
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In the induction step for t < T we handle the different cases separately. First,
assume t ∈ [τ t1, τ t2[ , say τ t1(ω(t)) =: k ≤ t: Then
UQt (ω(t)) =max
{
Xt(ω(t)),min
P∈Q
[Ut+1|Ft(ω(t))]
}
(IH)
= max
{
Xt(ω(t)), min
pt+1∈[p,p]{
pt+1u(t+ 1, Stu, k, τ
t+1
2 (ω(t), 1)) + (1− pt+1)u(t+ 1, Std, k, τ t+12 (ω(t), 0))
}}
.
By induction hypothesis and due to τ t+12 (ω(t), 0) ≥ τ t+12 (ω(t), 1), properties
(ii) and (iii) for t+ 1 imply
u(t+ 1, Std, k, τ
t+1
2 (ω(t), 0)) ≥ u(t+ 1, Stu, k, τ t+12 (ω(t), 1)). Therefore,
UQt (ω(t)) =max
{
Xt(ω(t)), pu(t+ 1, Stu, k, τ
t+1
2 (Stu)) + (1− p)u(t+ 1, Std, k, T + 1)
}
= Uˆt(ω(t)).
Hence, in this case UQt is a function u(t, St, τ
t
1, τ
t
2) which is decreasing in
S since A(t, ·) is decreasing in S by assumption, and u(t + 1, ·, k, τ t2(·)) is
monotone decreasing in S by induction hypothesis (property (ii), (iii), re-
spectively).
Second, if t ≥ τ t2(ω(t)) =: l < T, and τ t1(ω(t)) =: k < l:
UQt (ω(t)) =max
{
Xt(ω(t)), min
pt+1∈[p,p]
(pt+1u(t+ 1, Stu, k, l) + (1− pt+1)u(t+ 1, Std, k, l))}
= 0,
since Xt(ω(t)) = 0 by assumption and u(t + 1, ·, k, l) = 0 by induction hy-
pothesis (property (iii)).
Third, assume the case t < τ t1(ω(t)) = T + 1:
Then Xt = 0 and therefore we get in the first case when τ
t+1
1 (ω(t), 1) = T +1
UQt (ω(t)) = min
pt+1∈[p,p]
{
pt+1u(t+ 1, Stu, τ
t+1
1 (ω(t), 1), T + 1)
+(1− pt+1)u(t+ 1, Std, τ t+11 (ω(t), 0), T + 1)
}
= pu(t+ 1, Stu, T + 1, T + 1) + (1− p)u(t+ 1, Std, T + 1, T + 1)
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by induction hypothesis (property (i)). Hence, pt+1 = p and u(t, ·, T+1, T+1)
is increasing in S.
In the second case when τ t+11 (ω(t), 1) = t+ 1:
UQt (ω(t)) = min
pt+1∈[p,p]
{pt+1u(t+ 1, Stu, t+ 1, T + 1)
+ (1− pt+1)u(t+ 1, Std, T + 1, T + 1)}
= pu(t+ 1, Stu, t+ 1, T + 1) + (1− p)u(t+ 1, Std, T + 1, T + 1)
= u(t, St, T + 1, T + 1)
again by induction hypothesis (property (i) since St · u = S¯1) and we obtain
pt+1 = pτ t+11 = p. In order to show the monotonicity note that by induction
hypothesis (property (i)) the last expression is greater or equal to
pu(t+ 1, St, T + 1, T + 1) + (1− p)u(t+ 1, Stdd, T + 1, T + 1) which again is
equal to u(t, Std, T + 1, T + 1) (see the first case).
Thus, for showing property (i) we just have to prove that u(t, S¯1, t, T +1) ≥
u(t, S¯1d, T + 1, T + 1). Using property (i) of induction hypothesis we obtain
u(t, S¯1d, T + 1, T + 1) = pu(t+ 1, S¯1, t+ 1, T + 1)
+ (1− p)u(t+ 1, S¯1 · d2, T + 1, T + 1)
≤ pu(t+ 1, S¯1, t+ 1, T + 1)
+ (1− p)u(t+ 1, S¯1, t+ 1, T + 1)
= u(t+ 1, S¯1, t+ 1, T + 1)
≤ u(t, S¯1, t, T + 1).
The last inequality is due to Lemma A.1. This completes the proof and
(UQt ) satisfies the same recursion as (Uˆt). Thus, (U
Q
t ) = (Uˆt) follows and the
worst-case measure Pˆ is specified by the density DˆT as claimed.
An optimal stopping time is given by τˆ . This follows by general theory,
see Riedel (2009). The time boundary σ of the optimal stopping rule is due
to the claim’s knock-out feature. 2
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